12th Armee – April 1945

Walther Wenck

While the Germans fully expected the main threat to come from the Soviets in the east, they were aware as well of the Anglo-American troops driving towards them from the West. Although many of them nursed a clandestine hope that the Western Allies would beat the Soviets to Berlin, they weren't going to leave the capital's western approach undefended. In early April, General Walther Wenck, formerly Chief of Staff to General Guderian at the OKH and then briefly Himmler's Chief of Staff at Army Group Vistula, was called back from convalescent leave for wounds sustained in a February automobile accident to take command of the newly organised 12th Army. He was given a two-part mission. His primary task was to shore up the rapidly receding western front between the armies of Field Marshals Ernst Busch and Albrecht Kesselring, Commanders in Chief North-west and West respectively, now taking a severe beating from the British and North American forces racing eastwards with barely a pause since the landings at Normandy in June 1944. But Hitler had also envisioned a plan whereby Wenck's 12th Army would launch a massive counter-attack against General Bradley's 12th Army Group, now making rapid progress toward the Elbe. The idea was to slice a 320km (200 mile) swath straight through General William Simpson's Ninth Army to the Ruhr pocket, thereby releasing the 300,000 men of Model's Army Group B and splitting the armies of Montgomery and Bradley. Hitler wanted to achieve this improbable feat by appropriating a Soviet trick. He instructed the officers of the new 12th Army to round up 200 nondescript Volkswagen automobiles and use them to infiltrate the enemy lines and disrupt the rear to effect the breakthrough.

Even if the plan had been realistic when formulated, it never got the chance to be tested: the front was moving too rapidly eastwards. Indeed, Wenck had some trouble catching up with his new headquarters as it continually retreated to the East. He received a rude shock, and a quick education in the reality of the military situation when, on his way to assuming his new command, he attempted to stop in his hometown of Weimar to withdraw his family's savings from the bank: American tanks from General George S. Patton's Third Army were already there. Within two days of Hitler's elaboration of his plan, on 13 April, the Allies succeeded in cutting Model's forces in the Ruhr pocket in two and capturing the eastern half. Model had already told his troops that he was dissolving Army Group B on his own authority to save them the humiliation of surrender; it was left to each man whether to surrender individually, continue fighting, or attempt to make his way home through the Allied lines.

Wenck finally caught up with his headquarters near Rosslau, some 75km (46 miles) south-west of Berlin. Positioned along a 200km (125 miles) front from Wittenberge down the River Elbe to Leipzig, the 12th Army was supposed to have been made up of 10 divisions, some 200,000 soldiers, composed of Panzer Training Corps officers, cadets, Volkssturmer, and the remains of 11th Army, which had been involved in some ferocious fighting in the Harz Mountains. But much of Wenck's army, he quickly discovered, existed only on paper. Some of the units were still in the process of being organised but, at most, he had at his disposal roughly five and a half divisions, with 55,000 men. These were equipped with a few self-propelled guns, about 40 personnel carriers, and a number of fixed artillery positions at bridges and around cities like Magdeburg. The outlook was not encouraging. But the situation throughout what remained of the Reich was bleak, and Wenck, the Wehrmacht's youngest general, faced it with surprising vigour and imagination. Determined to hold the Western Allies at the Elbe for as long as possible, while at the same time freeing up as many men as possible to help shield Berlin from the Soviets, he intended to use the most experienced of the 12th's few and green forces as a sort of mobile shock troop, shuttling them from crisis to crisis. To this end he positioned his best forces in Magdeburg and other centrally located urban centres.

Wenck's instincts for focusing on the cities were sound, though it didn't require too much military genius to understand that this last stage of the war would be fought predominantly in large, urban areas. There had been some significant city battles fought already in this war, most notably in Stalingrad and Warsaw. But for the most part it had been a war of large-scale, mobile operations conducted in open terrain or before cites; the kind of warfare best suited to the era's fascination with tanks and other mobile armour. But in April 1945, on the eve of the war's final act, with Germany's room for maneuvering and building reserves rapidly disappearing, that kind of operational depth was no longer available. Inevitably, particularly given the Allies' insistence on Germany's unconditional surrender and Hitler's inability to consider any kind of retreat or surrender, the final battle would almost certainly have to be fought inside the Third Reich's capital.

Volkssturm-East Prussia

Plans for a militia, or home guard, had been discussed at various levels of the Party throughout the war, and the Wehrmacht staff had also considered how such a militia might be used to garrison defensive positions. On 6 September 1944, Guderian and Hitler once more discussed the matter, and the creation of this new force was officially sanctioned. Immediately, all of the rivals for power in Nazi Germany demanded the right to lead the force. Determined to prevent Himmler from securing control of this new force, Bormann was able to announce on 26 September that Hitler had entrusted the organization and leadership of the Volkssturm, as it was to be called, to the Party.

The creation of the Volkssturm, to be mobilized if the enemy crossed the German frontier, was trumpeted loudly by the German press. Immediately, it became clear that there were insufficient weapons and uniforms for the new units, and training opportunities were severely limited. Despite the propaganda, most German people could see that the Volkssturm would have little fighting power. As leaders for the new units, East Prussia Gauleiter Koch appointed only trusted Party figures, who continued to believe in Hitler, the Party and final victory. Inevitably, almost all these figures had no military experience.

Once more Koch drew on his considerable energies, this time to seek out weapons for the East Prussian Volkssturm. Nearly 500,000 Reichsmarks were spent to purchase weapons and uniforms, many of them on the black market in Italy, where some weapons were even purchased from anti-Nazi Italian partisans.  Despite this, the military value of the Volkssturm remained questionable. Koch and Himmler spoke in Leipzig shortly after the creation of the Volkssturm, but were less than fulsome in the language that they used, perhaps because they did not wish the inhabitants of areas that were still some distance from the frontline to be too alarmed by the need for such desperate measures.

German alarm at the Soviet assault was widespread, and Gauleiter Koch had already issued orders for the Volkssturm in Treuburg to be mobilized. The training of the Volkssturm was non-existent and their equipment patchy, despite Koch's attempts to acquire weapons. Even worse, there were often no uniforms for them, and consequently the Soviet forces treated them as irregular formations, exempt from what passed for the normal rules regarding prisoners on the Ostfront. In keeping with his self-image as the people's general, Koch explicitly forbade the Volkssturm commanders from communicating officially with local military commanders, with the result that regular units had to rely on local, informal contacts to determine the exact locations and strengths of Volkssturm formations. Now, Hitler authorized a more general mobilization of the Volkssturm:

While the enemy believes that we are approaching the end, we will make a second call on the strength of our people. We will and must succeed, as we did in 1939-1940, relying on our strength not only to defeat the destructive will of the enemy but to expel them from the Reich in such a way that the future of Germany, of our allies, and therefore of all Europe, is ensured and peace is secured.

The Goldap Battalion was a typical Volkssturm formation. It numbered about 400 men, and was organized in four companies. It was fortunate in that the company commanders were reserve officers. Equipped with a mixture of Russian rifles, German light machine-guns and Panzerfaust anti-tank weapons, these men now prepared to face the feared Bolsheviks. In all, perhaps 160,000 Volkssturm were mobilized, but despite repeated requests from Reinhardt and his subordinates, Koch insisted on retaining control of these men. Only in a few locations were individual Volkssturm battalions attached to regular formations.

The local Volkssturm found themselves in the thick of the fighting. The Goldap Battalion took up defensive positions north of Goldap on 18 December, and went into action three days later, pounding advancing Soviet forces with its few mortars. The Red Army infantry pulled back, but the following day there was a heavy Soviet artillery bombardment on the entire area, inflicting considerable casualties on the Volkssturm. Now under Wehrmacht command, the battalion was ordered to withdraw to the west the following day, having lost 76 men killed or wounded out of its original 400.

In his New Year 1945 message to the German nation, Hitler characteristically showed no sign of doubt:

Millions of Germans of all callings and backgrounds, men and women, youths and girls, right down to the children, have laboured with spades and shovels. Thousands of Volkssturm battalions have been raised or are being formed. Divisions have been re-equipped. People's artillery corps, rocket brigades and assault gun brigades as well as armoured formations have been deployed, fighter squadrons once more refreshed and supplied with new machines, and above all the German factories have through the efforts of their male and female workers achieved singular results. In this way, whatever our enemies destroy has been restored with superhuman diligence and heroic courage, and this will continue until one day our enemies will find their end. That, my fellow countrymen, will be regarded as the wonder of the 20th century! A people, who labour so endlessly at the front and in the homeland, who endure so much ill fortune, will never be ground down. They will come out of this furnace tested and stronger than ever before in their history.

Werewolf - Allied Interrogations of Walter Schellenberg

Schellenberg does not remember the exact date, but thinks it was in the late autumn of 1944 when Himmler, in the form of a long statement made in the presence of Schellenberg, Obergruppenfuehrer Pruetzmann, Skorzeny and he believes also of Kaltenbrunner, declared for the first time that he had selected Pruetzmann as the chief of a new organisation called "Werewolf" after the title of the book by Leons [Hermann Löns].149 He said that his organisation was completely independent and would be built up in the manner of the "Gauleitungen". Pruetzmann would form the organisation in close collaboration with the Gauleiters. The RSHA, especially Skorzeny, would have to provide the fullest support regarding technical needs and training. Pruetzmann would have to be aided above all in respect of W/T needs. (He had planned to set up a central transmitting station in caves in the Kyffhaeuser, a mountain in Thuringia, and was to be assisted by officers of the Ordnungspolizei. Schellenberg does not know if the station actually operated.) Kaltenbrunner and Skorzeny were not satisfied with this decision and sabotaged Pruetzmann's work from the very beginning by pleading ignorance or being evasive when he addressed queries to them or made requests.

Schellenberg says that the whole question left him completely cold, especially as Obergruppenfuehrer Berger began to interfere in it. Berger maintained close relations with Pruetzmann and tried to assume the command over the Werewolf when the possibility arose that Pruetzmann was being sent to Croatia as HSS u. PF or even as Wehrmacht commander (in the same manner as Wolff in Italy). As Pruetzmann started his job without personnel he picked from everywhere particularly reliable SS leaders "Prpo" [Orpo?] and members of the Wehrmacht. Kaltenbrunner provided for Pruetzmann, Obersturm-bannfuehrer Tschier [s] chky (he was for a while in charge of VI. C but had been handed over by Schellenberg owing to incapability). Pruetzmann who in the end did not get to Agram, Tschier [s] chky and the rest of the staff had a special train and began "wildly to organise".

Schellenberg gathered this from the continuous complaints of Lt. Colonel Boening and Major Poretschkin (VI. F and Mil. E) who in accordance with the instructions received from Himmler had to help with the provision of W/T installation and training.

Soon Schellenberg ceased co-operation in this field. The reasons given for this cessation of co-operation were first that Amt VI had no W/T installations which they could spare, and second that according to a report made by Lt. Col. Boening from Wiesbaden the boys who had arrived there for a W/T training course were "raw" to such an extent that they had to be sent home again by the officer in charge. Thereupon Pruetzmann attached himself technically entirely to the Orpo and to the Wehrmacht and as far as Schellenberg remembers his departments had nothing more to do with Pruetzmann. Schellenberg does not know how far Skorzeny and his "Jagdverbaende" were still meant to co-operate with the Werewolf. Skorzeny worked completely independently in direct control with Kaltenbrunner. Schellenberg is convinced that the collaboration between Skorzeny and Pruetzmann was not very good as Skorzeny planned establishing a sort of Werewolf organisation of his own with his SS "Jagdverbaende". Besides Tschier [s] chky and Skorzeny were personal enemies. Schellenberg does not think that Pruetzmann was able to build up a large and strong organisation. Pruetzmann himself was a desperado and always boasted having played as a young man a part in the Ruhr and Rhineland struggle. The little Schellenberg has seen of the organisation of Pruetzmann, Tschier [s] chky and their large staff corresponded, as he says, to their mental capacity; it was weak. Schellenberg maintains that in April 1945 he reproached Himmler severely regarding the Werewolf, calling this enterprise "criminal and stupid". He thinks that his reproaches lead to contradictory orders being issued. The whole Werewolf organisation was built up, how it was to function and how it did in fact function [sic.]. One name Schellenberg remembers, that of SS Standartenfuehrer Knolle, formerly in The Hague, who was responsible for the Hamburg area.

In the end Pruetzmann began to pick out his men from the Army Groups as well as the armies. He also started to establish depots for material. This was reported to Schellenberg by Colonel Buntrock, chief of reconnaissance at the front. Schellenberg says that he did not trouble to oppose these activities of Pruetzmann for the disorder whithin the so-called "retreat organisation" had become uncontrollable in the course of the last months. At the end everything was compressed as in an accordion: Party, Hitler Youth, D. A. F., N. S. V., Stapo, SD., Klein Kampf Verbaende of the Wehrmacht Werewolf, SS Jagdverbaende- everything upside down and everybody solely responsible for everything. On top of it was added the Volkssturm. Schellenberg is of the opinion that Pruetzmann was most active within and in connection with the Hitler Jugend. Schellenberg does not know with whom Pruetzmann collaborated there. His official title was General Inspector for special Abwehr.