By Gerhard Rempel
During the month of June, while the Body Guard recovered
from the exhaustive Battle of Kharkov, SS Colonel Fritz Witt, chief of its 1st
Armored Infantry Regiment, received appointment as commander of the HJD.
Typical of an aggressive new breed of young SS officers, Witt brought with him
a select number of officers, sergeants and technical specialists. The rest of
the officers were transferred from army and SS divisions or activated from
reserve status as the original plan provided. More than half of them must have
been former HJ leaders. A shortage of company commanders, platoon and squad
leaders, was gradually filled when "training assistants" arrived from
the SS NCO schools. Many NCOs were barely a year older or even the same age as
the young soldiers they commanded. In July and August the first 10,000 boys
arrived to commence basic training in Beverloo, Belgium, while various units
were formed and shaped into battle condition. The CG of the 1st SS Panzer
Division, Sepp Dietrich, had already gotten Hitler's permission to provide
these boys with food rations normally reserved for combat soldiers, but August
Pohl, the chief of the SS Economic and Administrative Office, arranged to give
them special rations much more substantial than those allotted to workers in
heavy industry.
There were two battalion commanders in the HJD who were merely
26 years old and three other top commanders in their late 20s. This was quite
unusual enough, but those below battalion level were nearly all in their early
20s and the bulk of the enlisted men were 17 during training and 18 at the time
of their first combat engagement. It was indeed the "Baby Division"!
The youthful character of the division not only worried the RJF but also
Goebbels, who feared that Allied propaganda might interpret it as a sign of
desperation, which it clearly was. Allied intelligence did refer to the
"Baby Division" derisively in radio broadcasts and propaganda
leaflets, suggesting the milk bottle as its tactical symbol. Hitler,
nonetheless, believed his youngsters would fight "fanatically" and
predicted that the enemy would be "struck with wonder." He was right.
Two months before the division was committed to combat Witt
issued one of his periodic special directives dealing with discipline and
order. He complained that many unit leaders still failed to understand that
their primary duty was to "shape young soldiers into straight and decent
SS men." Many company commanders apparently had forgotten that their
charges had grown up with fathers away at the front and mothers employed, with
the best teachers and most capable HJ leaders on the long list of casualties.
Unit leaders therefore had to become substitute educators. Providing models to
imitate was the best form of instruction and this required daily association,
since the company was the only world these impressionable recruits knew. Witt
then ordered platoon and squad leaders to live in the same room with their men
to show that they cared about their welfare. Such concern was a soldier's
"most beautiful task." Every noncommissioned officer "should
appreciate the valuable German human material entrusted to him."
At least three hours a week were set aside for
indoctrination to be conducted by company commanders. After eight years of
incessant doctrinal drilling in the HJ and four weeks of intensive
propagandizing in the WELs, it was still deemed necessary to conduct regular
weekly indoctrination sessions within the division itself. Witt believed, as
most SS officers believed, that the war against Soviet Russia had made it
painfully clear that a "fanatically indoctrinated enemy" could only
be conquered by the "bearer of a superior ideology." Every young
soldier therefore had to know what he fought for. Hence, "attitude,
spiritual strength and emotional power" were thought to be the deciding
factors in "popular wars." Company commanders were expected to
dedicate themselves to this task of with vigor and responsibility. The themes
they used were no surprise: "Germany's demand for living space",
"the enemies of Germany are the enemies of Europe", and similar
platitudes familiar to these boys since the age of ten, when most of them had
entered the Junvolk and ceased to be children.
Every opportunity - the waking
call, roll call, a pause during training, an infrequent free hour - was to be
utilized by officers and NCOs to "clarify and impregnate the weekly
theme." Aiming to create a fighting force of true believers required that
every man "grasped internally what he fought for." Immature youths
had to be transformed into men "who lived according to the fundamentals of
the SS as fanatic warriors", willing to sacrifice all and give no quarter.
Fritz Witt declared the training period to be concluded on
March 16, 1944: "The...situation happily is a good one. Our...boys during
these eight months have been transformed into young men who know the military
craft." To celebrate the miraculous metamorphosis Witt ordered that the
candy rations thus far issued be replaced by cigarettes. In April the Division
was transferred to France and located southwest of Rouen, the remaining men and
equipment being added in the process. If the Division attained prescribed
strength - and there is every reason to believe that it did - by the beginning
of June it had some 20,000 men and officers, 177 tanks, 700 machine guns, 70
mortars, 37 infantry guns and howitzers, 40 field and medium guns, 33 anti-tank
guns and over 100 pieces of varied anti-tank artillery. Motor vehicles, armored
troop carriers and tractors brought the total to some 2,950 vehicles. We know
for certain that the Division had at least 20 more tanks than the average SS
Panzer Division and certainly more than army equivalents. Since the HJD was
trumpeted as a "junior Body Guard" and since Hitler had specifically
ordered that it be fully equipped, there is little doubt that it was one of the
better supplied fighting units of the war. There were always devious ways to
acquire desired officers and equipment if normal channels failed to supply
them, as Witt's most resourceful regimental commander, Kurt Meyer, and his
young subordinate officers, repeatedly demonstrated.
One source of strength lay in the HJ origin of the
personnel. The tie to the RJF was carefully maintained by assiduous propaganda
and by visits of Youth Leader Artur Axmann, who made at least two formal
inspection tours. During the first Witt ordered commanders to discuss plans
with Axmann and had all positions of honor occupied by young men, making sure
that the Youth Leader was accorded the same respect as W-SS generals by special
order of Himmler himself. Axmann spent some time with most battalions and even
with smaller units. During the second visit he brought along Dutch and
Norwegian youth leaders, no doubt at the suggestion of Gottlob Berger who was,
of course, eager to influence SS recruitment in the occupied countries. The RJF
also assumed troop welfare for the Division in order "to solidify the
special tie of the national socialist movement with the Division." Musical
groups, theatrical troupes, letter-writing campaigns and dispatch of packages
fell under this program. Ties with individual battalions and smaller formations
were later established by regional HJ directorates.
All of this meticulous care in organizing, training and
preparing the "Baby Division" was carried out in order to avoid the
errors of Langemarck which hung over these activities as an ominous cloud. It
was also done because the planners believed the HJD could make a difference by
setting an instructive example and reversing the rising tide of defeatism and
cynical indifference among regular army troops. These notions were soon to be
tested when the HJD experienced its bloody baptism of fire in a crucial sector
of the Battle for Normandy, around and in the city of Caen. When British and
Canadian troop landed in the estuary of the Orne, the HJD surprised them. The
youngsters of the HJ fought ferociously and with a suicidal determination that
appalled German and Allied commanders who were not particulary sensitive or
inexperienced. The HJD and its patron the Body Guard, which arrived on the
scene belatedly, held up Bernard Montgomery's advance for a whole month. In the
process they were destroyed. The Battle of Caen become the Stalingrad of the
Hitler Youth.
From June 7 until July 9 the HJD lost 4,000 dead and 8,000
wounded and missing. An Allied officer thought that it had "fought with a
tenacity and fierceness" such as he had not seen in the entire European
campaign. A few days later, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, in conversation with
"Sepp" Dietrich and Kurt Meyer, recognized the unique attitude of the
HJD: "Your soldiers possess the spirit of the young regiments of
Langemarck, but are far better trained and above all led by front-experienced
officers and NCOs. It is a shame that his faithful youth is being sacrificed in
a hopeless cause." Erwin Rommel made similar remarks shortly before his
death.
But the end was not yet in sight. What followed was
attrition, gradually grinding the remaining elements of the division to shreds.
New headquarters were established at Potigny north of Falaise. Regimental
staffs were withdrawn to hammer new replacements into marching companies, while
remaining troops were organized into two "Battle Groups." With some
50 remaining tanks the latter played a significant role in spiking three
separate British offensives between Caen and Falaise, prolonging the capture of
Falaise for a month. A concerted counter-attack at Cintheaux, organized by Kurt
Meyer, and isolated victories demonstrated that the HJ had lost none of its
resolute combat elan. When Falaise was finally taken by the Canadians on August
16 a remnant of 60 Hitler youths held out in the ruins of the Ecole Superieure
until all but two messengers, chosen by lot, were dead. The rest of the
Division helped to keep the pincers of the Falaise-Argentan pocket open long
enough to allow two decimated German Armies to escape. By September 4, 1944 the
fighting strength of the division was enlarged again to 600 men from the 200
who slipped out of the pocket, but the sum and substance of its effectiveness
had been destroyed. Eighty percent of the original combat personnel had been
annihilated, and similar losses had been sustained by the support troops. The
Division lost 80 percent of its tanks, 70 percent of its armored vehicles, 60
percent of its artillery and mortars and 50 percent of the rest of its
vehicles.
The RJF made feeble recruiting efforts to rebuild its elite
formation. In some areas 15 year olds were drafted to shore up dwindling
reserves. Axmann even made plans to establish a separate reserve organization
for the Division, but little came of this nonsensical effort. The shock of Caen
had been too great. The Division was replenished with air force ground
personnel, navy personnel and recuperated veterans from military hospitals.
Some new HJ recruits must also have been added. This patched-up division, with
little resemblance to its former elite character, was engaged in the Battle of
the Bulge and subsequently in Hungary and Austria, with some isolated effect.
On May 5, 1945, the "Baby Division" was withdrawn
from futile, last-ditch efforts to defend Vienna, their patron's libidinal
battleground a generation before. SS Major General Hugo Kraas, the last
commander of the 12th SS Panzer Division, gave his men free reign to follow
their natural inclination to escape the clutches of the aproaching Russian troops
by moving west toward the American lines. Three days later, near the small town
of Enns, 6,000 weary and bedraggled survivors of the once proud HJD tried to
cross a bridge across the Danube. It had been blocked by other HJ boys working
in tank-trap battalions organized by Gauleiter Baldur von Schirach. Someone
cried "Russky!" and panic broke loose as all stampeded towards a
narrow gap on the bridge. Trucks rammed into the surging mass and killed at
least 15 of them, scattering the fleeing hordes along both sides of the river.
A single Russian tank "clanked toward the bridge. A Red Army lieutenant
stood in the turret, laughing at the sight of 6,000 men frantically scrambling
to escape his single gun." Towards the end of the day a faithful remnant
of 455 men and one tank marched before Hugo Krass for the last time. In a final
symbolic act of arrogant defiance, the HJ-SS soldiers refused to obey an
American order to drape their vehicles in white flags and drove into American
captivity "proud and erect."
"Panzermeyer", as his admiring boys called him,
had been the soul of courage, strength and defiance. He led thousands of Hitler
youths to what most of them probably perceived to be heroic deaths. On
September 6, 1944, while the emaciated remnants of the HJD fought another in a
long series of small holding actions near Namur, Belgium, Kurt Meyer became an
Allied prisoner. He was subsequently the first German officer to be tried as a
war criminal. A SHAEF court of inquiry alleged that soldiers and officers of the
12th SS Panzer Division "shot 64 unarmed allied prisoners of war in
uniforms, many of whom had been previously wounded, and none of whom had
resisted or endeavored to escape." SHAEF investigators also alleged that
"it was understood throughout the division that a policy of denying
quarter or executing prisoners after interrogation was openly approved."
These crimes purportedly took place between June 7 and 17, and responsibility
for them was distributed to all three regiments of the division.
Kurt Meyer was tried and condemned to death by a Canadian
military court for collusion in the shooting of Canadian and British prisoners.
His sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment and on September 7, 1954
he was released. The commutation and release stirred up considerable
controversy in Canada and elsewhere. Meyer admitted that certain atrocities
occurred in the W-SS, but refused to acknowledge guilt in this particular case.
The responsibility of other officers under his command remains like that of
Meyer an open question. The guilt of lower-ranking soldiers cannot be
determined with any degree of certainty either. In the latter case there is the
additional problem of legal and illegal orders.
The distinction between murder and legalized slaughter, in
the context of military combat, is always difficult to make. Every war leaves
behind a trail of atrocity charges and counter-charges. It is not surprising
that an unusually high number of atrocities were committed by the combat
personnel of the SS during World War Two. The effort of W-SS veterans to
rehabilitate their post-war image by denying connection to the genocidal
policies and crimes of the SS organization has long since been discredited. The
self-serving attempt by the regular German army officers to pass all blame for
war crimes onto the SS has come under general suspicion as well. Accepting the
theory of collective guilt, the Nuremberg Tribunal condemned the entire SS as a
criminal organization, thereby painting every man who wore its uniform with the
brush of personal crime. Such a conclusion cannot survive the test of
historical evidence. Yet a great number of ordinary murders were committed by
the soldiers of the W-SS.
In the case of the HJD the atrocities, to the degree that
they actually occurred, were symbolic of SS influence. The aggressive,
reckless, at times even fanatic, leadership, exercised by ambitious young SS
officers like Meyer, certainly contributed to the process of blurring clear
distinctions between murder and "legal" killing in combat conditions.
Other factors, in this dehumanizing process, were the tender, impressionable
age of most of the soldiers in the division, the long years of assiduous racial
indoctrination, and the circumstances of defeat and frustration which enveloped
the vastly outnumbered German forces in the Normandy Theater. The result was a
form of barbarism born of desperation, primitive revenge and arrogant defiance.
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